The fourth Nordic conference on Middle Eastern Studies:
The Middle East in globalizing world
Oslo, 13-16 August 1998

Towards secularisation?

Developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran after Khomeini

Lars Haugom
University of Oslo

I. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to discuss briefly in what sense and to which extent a secularisation process can be said to be in train in Iranian politics.

II. The concept of secularisation

In the social sciences, the concept is mainly used in four different ways:

1. The first and more general process is the secularisation of society, or a development towards greater independence from religion in the fields of government, science and scholarship, the economy, the school system, art, family and law (Høibraathen, 1993:234-235).
2. Secondly, it is sometimes used as synonymous with secularism, an ideology which seeks to privatise religious faith, eliminate all religious symbols, authorities and organisations from public life and found political power on worldly ethical principles (Tripp, 1996:52). Such a political program was for example pursued in Turkey under Kemal Atatürk, and continues to be a pillar in the Turkish constitution today.
3. Secularisation, however, also denotes the diminishing role of religion in political culture, that is in political attitudes and belief-patterns (Statsvitenskapelig leksikon:245-246). This process is not necessarily connected to secularisation as a political program. Even though governments may seek to secularise the political culture, they are not always successful. For example: The growing support for Islamist parties in Turkey after 1970 seems to indicate that religion still plays an important role in the Turkish political culture despite decades of official secularism.
4. Finally, secularisation can be used in an institutional sense. By institutional secularisation is meant a process of differentiation in which the bonds between religious and political institutions are loosened; religion is less supported by law, political decisions and representative arrangements; and public services, for example in the fields of health and education, are transferred from religious to secular agencies (Statsvitenskapelig leksikon:245-246). Again, this type of secularisation is not necessarily connected to neither secularism or secularisation of the political culture. Secularism can mean that religious institutions are brought under political control, not separated from state institutions. Furthermore, there are countries in the world where religion continues to play an important role in the political culture even though political and religious institutions are constitutionally separated. The United States is here a case in point. Conversely, there are states where religion plays a negligent role in the political culture, but where established churches nevertheless remain closely tied to the state and where religion is given a privileged constitutional status. The Scandinavian countries are examples of this (Blackwell, 1991:527-529). In Norway, for example, where the political culture is markedly secular, the Constitution continues to state that not only Christianity but a specific version of it, the Evangelical-Lutheran creed, remains the religion of the state, and over ninety per cent of the population automatically become members of the state-church at birth.

The Islamic Republic, as it was established in 1979, belong to the rare category of theocracies, political systems where religious institutions and their personnel rule directly through the institutions of government. The new republic based its legitimacy on two constitutional pillars, first the doctrine of velayet-i faqih, or the guardianship of the jurisconsult, represented in practice by Ayatollah Khomeini himself, and secondly notions of "limited popular sovereignty" in the constitution (Milani, 1997:82-83).

Khomeini's political theory is centred around the question of leadership of the Islamic state, which is vested in the just Faqih. It starts with the premise that Islam as a religion must include a system of government. Islam is first and foremost divine law, a law given not just to be studied and analysed by learned men, but applied and instituted as a state-form. The supreme political leader of the Islamic state must therefore have total knowledge of Islamic law and be able to apply it justly (Zubaida, 1993:16-17). Consequently, the Faqih must come from the higher ranks of the religious establishment. In fact, Article 107 of the original 1979 Constitution stated that the supreme leader must be a marja taqlid, or a source of religious emulation, the one whose interpretations is most widely accepted by the faithful. This is a title only rewarded to a handful of clerics at the top of the Shia clerical hierarchy.

The second pillar is that of popular sovereignty. According to the Iranian constitution, absolute sovereignty belongs to God alone, while political power emanates from God, the Faqih and the people, in that order. The principal of popular sovereignty is vested in the constitution, however, because it states that the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion as expressed in elections and referenda. But this sovereignty is limited, because the unelected Faqih and the Council of Guardians are empowered to veto all legislation and reject the credentials of presidential and national assembly candidates (Ehteshami, 1996:82-83; Milani, 1997:82-83).

In sum, the 1979 constitution ended the division of religious and secular rule in Iran, the latter being subsumed by the former, and opened for the direct rule in secular affairs of the religious classes. The faqih was given sweeping powers in the new system, including the right to appoint the highest judicial authorities and to be commander-in-chief.

Now, in what sense and to which extent can we say that this system has been undergoing a secularisation process since 1989?

III. Secularisation in Iran after Khomeini

When it comes to the secularisation of society in a broad sense, however, there are signs that a certain liberalisation may be in train. The dress codes and other regulations of public behaviour are not as rigidly enforced as before, the authorities interfere less in the private lives of citizens than during the 1980's, censorship of art, books and the mass media has been eased, and Western popular culture is slowly finding its way back into Iranian society, not least by means of satellite television. However, relaxation of the laws of public conduct and the easing of censorship does not mean that these regulations are about to be lifted. With a conservative majority in the legislative assembly, a conservative judiciary, and a number of religious councils set up to oversee the enforcement of Islamic law in society and politics, any real secularisation of Iranian society may still be a long way off.

This conclusion also seems to hold true when we turn to the political culture in Iran today. On the one hand, there is a legal political opposition with relaxation of the socio-cultural system and greater political freedom on its programme. This opposition is organised in the Servants of Construction faction, a recently formed political grouping which captured a significant number of seats in last years parliamentary election and to which president Mohammad Khatami is associated. Khatami was elected on May 23 last year on a reformist program, stressing, among other things, the need for more political freedom in Iran and the importance of involving women more extensively in managing the state and the economy. He has expressed his admiration for much of Western culture, and is associated with a more liberal tendency on cultural issues. His program obviously struck a cord among Iranians, in particular among the youngest voters, women, the urban intelligentsia and the non-traditional business sector. Khatami won a landslide victory with almost 70 per cent of the vote, decisively defeating his opponent, the conservative Nateq Nuri (Nonneman, 1997:18-19).

For all his liberal views, however, the president has also been careful to stress his allegiance to the doctrine of Velayet-i Faqih which of course underpins the dominant position of the clergy in the Iranian power structure (MEI, 552:8). Moreover, the strong position of the conservatives in both the legislative assembly and the judiciary makes it difficult for Khatami's liberal government to push for reforms. The conservative faction in Iranian politics increasingly feel that their position as guardians of a pure Islamic system is under threat, and have recently started a campaign to block government reforms. Many observers of Iranian politics have seen the corruption trial last June against Gholamreza Karbaschi, the liberal mayor of Tehran and a central figure in the Servants of construction, as part of such a campaign. The judiciary has also maintained a steady pressure against the Iranian press, and is apparently hoping to curb the new freedom of media which has flourished since Khatami came to power last year (MEI, 577:14-15). It is of course too early to predict who will emerge victorious from this power struggle.

Actually, it is only when we turn to the relationship between political and religious institutions, that we find evidence of a more profound secularisation process in post-Khomeini Iran.

Institutional secularisation was defined above as the loosening of bonds between religious and political institutions, a process often initiated by the state itself to consolidate its own position and affirm its right to set the place for religion and not vice versa. In Iran such a process has been in train since the late 1980's.

In 1989 changes to the system were made which opened for a separation of politics and religion and tipped the balance of power between the state and the religious establishment in favour of the former. The first change was announced by Khomeini himself. Some months before his death, the Faqih ruled that the Islamic government, acting in the interest of the Islamic community, is empowered to suspend or alter any element of religious rules or worship, even prayer and fasting. This meant that, theoretically, both the constitution and the Shari'a could be set aside by the political leadership. It was in fact a clear affirmation of the government's right to set the place for the Shari'a and not vice versa (Zubaida, 1993:xxiii).

There were also important amendments made in the constitution following Khomieni's death. Failing to find a suitable successor to Khomeini among the leading ayatollahs, the qualifications needed to become leader was downgraded so that the incumbent would no longer have to be a marja. Consequently, the position of the faqih was reduced to little more than a political office, thereby separating supreme religious and political leadership in the Islamic state. At the same time, the presidency was upgraded to include the responsibilities of the prime minister, a position which was now abolished.

In sum, the executive branch of the Iranian government was strengthened and given the power to act more independently in relation to the religious establishment and Islamic law. In the words of Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "the republic since 1989 has come to resemble less a purely Islamic state and more a functional one in which a natural division of labour has emerged between the spiritual leader of the state and its executive leadership" (Ehteshami, 1996:146).

The growing independence for political institutions in Iran is also reflected in the composition of the legislative. The number of clerics in the assembly has declined steadily since the mid-1980's, while the number of representatives with technocratic backgrounds has grown. At present, less than half the representatives are drawn from the religious establishment (Ehteshami, 1996:147).

A more independent role for political institutions in Iran after 1989, is also reflected in more pragmatic government policies.

In foreign policy, the doctrine of non-alignment and support for Islamic and other third-world liberation movements is more or less abandoned. Under Khomeini, Iranian foreign policy gave priority to Islamic countries and Islamic ethics in world affairs, while avoiding bilateral and multilateral co-operation in a system dominated by Western powers. In the 1990's, in contrast, Iran has actively sought reintegration into the international system by promoting co-operation in the fields of economy, politics and culture, indicating that Iranian foreign policy is now guided more by pragmatism than by any Islamist persuasion. Iran's approach to the Gulf crisis and war in 1990/91, the Arab-Israeli peace process, co-operation with secular states in the Middle East and the rapprochement with the United States are all examples of Tehran's new foreign policy line (Ehteshami, 1996:147-151).

In the economic field, the policies of self-sufficiency and Islamic justice introduced under Khomeini have been replaced by a market economy along Western lines. Privatisation, de-regulation, reduction in food subsidies, export-oriented development and incentives for foreign investment are now central elements in the government's economic policies, elements which makes it difficult to distinguish the Islamic Republic from other states in the Middle East (Ehteshami, 1996:151-156).

It is in fact only in domestic politics that the legacy from the Khomeini years seems to linger on, at least to a certain extent. As mentioned above, censorship, dress codes, and Islamic systems of education and law are still in force. With a growing liberal opposition to the old regime, however, this may now be about to change. There seems to be a strong opposition in the country now, demanding a more liberal political system and a more relaxed social and cultural climate.

IV. Conclusion

How far the reforms will be taken will largelly depend on the outcome of the current power struggle between conservatives and liberals in the Iranian state elite, and how far the Islamic system in Iran can move in a secular direction without loosing the legitimacy on which it is based. At the time of writing, it is far from certain whether or not the Islamic state in Iran can accommodate the forces of change now challenging its foundations.

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