The fourth Nordic conference on Middle Eastern Studies:
The Middle East in globalizing world
Oslo, 13-16 August 1998

Inventing Middle Easts?

The making of regions through security discourses

Pinar Bilgin
University of Wales, Aberystwyth

NB *This is the unedited paper as given at the Oslo conference. An updated and edited version has been published in Utvik and Vikør, The Middle East in a Globalized World, Bergen/London 2000, 10-37. Please quote or refer only to the published article.*

(work in progress)

Globalisation, the theme of this conference, is one of the key concepts we hear about nowadays. We are often reminded that we live in a global world economy. We have all started thinking globally in one way or another. We are also becoming increasingly aware of each other largely due to the developments in information technology. However as people have become more aware of other peoples in other parts of the world, they have at the same time started to become more and more dependent upon the interactive network of this global world economy. Parallel to globalisation is another process at work, that of regionalisation. It is often argued that peoples of a globalising world, in search of some degree of control over their external environments have started taking action within their own milieu in cooperation with other actors sharing similar problems. [1] Regionalisation, in this sense, is seen as an attempt to come to terms with the forces of globalisation. [2] The end of the Cold War and bipolarity (i.e. de-centralisation in the international system) are also argued to have contributed to regionalisation in economic and security spheres. [3] Regionalisation and globalisation, then, may be viewed as two mutually reinforcing processes.

The 'Middle East' is no exception to these developments. Since the Gulf War and the beginning of the Middle East Peace Process, ample work has been done on regionalisation in the 'Middle East' (or lack of it). [4] Contradictory views have been expressed on this issue. Some, like Shimon Peres, have called for an increase in regionalism in the 'Middle East' as a complementary path towards establishing peace in the region. [5] Some others, however, expressed their worries and argued that those who call for regionalism in the 'Middle East' are trying to re-establish 'imperialism by regionalism'. [6] This is especially a concern voiced by certain segments of the Arab elite worried about the economic might of Israel, who they fear might dominate an integrated Middle East economy. [7]

This relatively little evidence of enthusiasm for regionalism in the 'Middle East' given the worldwide trend towards increasing regional integration (since the 1980s) is often seen as an anomaly. It has, for instance, been suggested that the 'Middle East' is 'a region without regionalism'; [8] in other words, an exception. Some of the recent literature on security in the 'Middle East', on the other hand, suggests that the problem in the 'Middle East' is not a lack of regionalism but a multiplicity of regionalisms (in terms of discourse if not in practice). This is what will be the main focus of this paper. I submit that the question we should be asking is not 'why there is a lack of enthusiasm and/or support for regionalism in the Middle East?'; but rather 'whose regionalism are we talking about?'.

There are contending definitions of what constitutes one's region. Saad Eddin Ibrahim in a recent article entitled 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East' has identified four such definitions (or paradigms as he terms it). [9] These are the Middle East, the Arab, the Mediterranean and the Islamic paradigms. His argument is that different paradigms comprise different visions of the future and parallel geopolitical-economic projects. There are some who view themselves as part of the 'Middle East' and work towards establishing peace in this part of the world. There are also others who emphasise the Arab character of this part of the world and define their region as the 'Arab regional order' (or the 'Arab homeland') [10] leaving Israel, Iran and Turkey outside. Thirdly, there are those who emphasise the 'Mediterranean' as an alternative regional conception bringing together South European countries with other Mediterranean littoral states. And lastly there are the proponents of the 'Muslim world' paradigm who seek to establish an alternative order through upholding 'Islamic' values and principles.

It should be noted here that the spatial conceptions that will be looked at in this paper do not necessarily correspond to the same geography. In other words, my main concern is not necessarily different definitions of the same geographical area; nor I am specially concerned with different labels given to the same part of the world such as the acronym SWANA (South West Asia and North Africa), or 'from Nile to Oxus' that have been created as part of an attempt to find an alternative label that is less Eurocentric. [11] The four spatial conceptions (regions) I will be focusing on are not simply different ways of looking at the same region; rather what will be looked at here are alternative spatial conceptions that are created in line with one's political philosophy and conception of security which may refer to an area larger or smaller than what is today referred to as the 'Middle East'. The argument here is that which states are covered in one spatial conception and omitted from another is indicative of one's conception of security, perception of threat, and the political project s/he upholds. [12] Accordingly, different actors with different philosophies and different political/economic projects regarding their future define the region they live in along these lines. [13]

This is not a phenomenon isolated to the 'Middle East', though. In other words, the 'Middle East' is not exception, as is sometimes presented. Ole Wæver, in his work on Europe has pointed to contending definitions of Europe and submitted that alternative definitions have their roots in alternative projects as to how to establish security in 'Europe'. To summarise in his work on Europe Wæver distinguished between four different conceptions (in security terms): i. Europe from Atlantic to the Urals, ii. Europe from Poland to Portugal; iii. Western Europe as Europe; iv. the European security area (CSCE/OSCE Europe) which, he argued, stemmed from four different understandings of the 'threat'. In similar lines to Ibrahim (on the 'Middle East') Wæver too emphasised the fact that each vision of 'Europe' has taken root from a different political agenda and brought with it a different security agenda the application of which would have different implications for security in Europe. [14]

In an article entitled 'Contending Philosophies About Security in Europe' Ken Booth and Nick Wheeler sought the roots of these contending conceptions of security in political philosophy and uncovered the role political philosophies play in the making of these contending conceptions of security and the projects that often run in parallel lines to these conceptions. [15] They wrote:

How people choose to define Europe will have a significant impact on how they think both about security in Europe and Europe's relations with the outside world. The chosen definition will provide the basis of the answer to the crucial question: who is 'us' and who is 'them' politically speaking? [16]

It should also be noted that in the recent years the burgeoning literature on regions and regionalism have also come to emphasise the 'invented' character of regions as opposed to some earlier conceptions which looked at regions as 'natural'. [17] Recent works in the field of political geography especially emphasise the invented/made character of regions and investigate the purposes behind the making of regions. The aim of this paper is to undertake a similar task for the 'Middle East' with a focus on the relationship between security and regions. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the origins of the 'Middle East' as a term and as a concept. The aim here would be to establish the processes and purposes behind the making of the 'Middle East' as a region. The second part of the paper will focus on the criticisms brought against the 'Middle East' as a term and as a concept (i.e. too Eurocentric, a 'colonial relic', etc.) and analyse three alternative conceptions, namely, the 'Arab regional order', the Mediterranean, and the Muslim World. It will be argued that as was the case with the 'Middle East', the other three definitions also have their roots in their inventors' political philosophy and conception of security.

It should be emphasised here that the conception of security I refer to is a broad one. I do not simply mean military security. Rather I include -following Ken Booth and Barry Buzan among others- [18] the economic, political, environmental and societal as well as military dimensions when I use the word security. The multidimensional character of security becomes all the more acute when the developing states (including most states in the 'Middle East') are concerned. In this sense, the relationship I try to establish between differing conceptions of security and definitions of regions does not simply derive from military security but from 'comprehensive security' cognisant of the interrelationships between different dimensions of security as well as the dynamics of the security dilemma at work in between states locked within a certain geography and/or a 'security complex'. [19] This conception of security I use also emphasises the linkages between one's political philosophy and his/her conception of what 'security' is or may be all about. In other words, different political philosophies deliver different conceptions of security. [20] Different conceptions of security in turn help make different regions through practice. In the third part of the paper, I will come back to this alternative approach to security mentioned above (that of Critical Security Studies) and try and present a spatial conception, i.e. that of a 'security complex'. First, let us turn to the origins of the 'Middle East' as a term and as a concept.

I. 'Middle East'/ Middle Easts: a 'shifting strategic concept'

In this sense, the argument can be and has indeed been made that its universal acceptance renders it unnecessary to question the term. If it has come to be widely accepted, why question its origins? It is true that the 'Middle East' is a 'colonial relic'; [26] it has been coined by an American strategist when writing about Britain's strategic interests as a colonial power; but so is the case with many other terms. Ghana was known as the Gold Coast until its independence. Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia were named after Cecil Rhodes, British administrator and financier. Their names were changed into Zimbabwe and Zambia after independence. People of Guinea, on the other hand, chose to retain a name that is also reminiscent of the colonial era. Moreover, the naming of land has often implied control of that land throughout history. [27] The peoples of the 'Middle East' have once been on the other (not receiving but giving) side of this relationship. The term 'Maghreb' has its origins in the geopolitics of an earlier epoch, that of the first waves of Arab invaders who came to North Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries. [28]

So, if it is not an exception in any sense, then why should we go back in history to find the origins of the term 'Middle East'? Why bother? My argument is that the questioning and identification of the origins and development of the term 'Middle East' is illustrative of the relationship between security discourses, practices and (in)security in the 'Middle East.' For, the 'Middle East' became a subject of (in)security by way of British and later American conceptions and practices of security. The term 'Middle East' originated as a part of the British security discourse. It later became 'common sense' to refer to the 'Middle East' due to the impact made by British and US security discourses. It came to be challenged by Arab nationalists as a part of the pan-Arab security discourses. [29]

Mahan had used the term 'Middle East to refer to the Gulf and its coasts. It was Valentine Chirol, then head of The Times' foreign department, who adopted and popularised the term by using it in a series of twenty articles entitled 'The Middle Eastern Question' (1902-3). [30] By the time The Times finished publishing Chirol's articles, it had ceased to place the term 'Middle East' in quotation marks. [31] Whilst adopting Mahan's term, Chirol had expanded the region it referred to for the purposes of his own argument. Chirol's 'Middle East' included not just the Gulf and its coasts -as was the case with Mahan's 'Middle East'- but all land as well as sea approaches to India: 'Persia, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the east coast of Arabia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.' [32] By this way, the definition of the 'Middle East' was firmly tied to the defence of India.

The area designated by the term expanded once again after World War I. By 1918, the British and French had overtaken the control of the former Ottoman territories of Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In 1921 the then Secretary of State for Colonies Winston Churchill set up in the Foreign Office a Middle Eastern Department to supervise Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. [33] These chunks of territory had not only become linked, in the minds of British policy-makers to the defence of the 'Middle East', but another factor, oil had entered the picture by this time. Although oil did not become a significant factor for a long time, the politics of oil was not totally absent either. By 1912 oil had begun to replace coal in the British Navy and Britain was anxious to find 'dependable sources of oil.' [34]

During the Second World War the British began to use the term 'Middle East' with reference to all Asian and North African lands to the west of India. No definite boundaries were ever set to the term. Roderic Davison notes that 'Iran was added in 1942; Eritrea was dropped in September 1941 and welcomed back again five months later.' The Middle East Supply Centre and the post of 'Minister of State in the Middle East' were also established during the War. The areas which the two had control over were not the same, but in general they stretched from Malta to Iran and from Syria to Ethiopia. [35]

Towards the end of the Second World War, the United States, alongside Britain, got involved in the 'Middle East' and adopted the British wartime definition. It is interesting to note that the US Department of State, for a long time, stuck with its own tradition and continued to practice with an office of Near Eastern Affairs. In 1957, when the Eisenhower Doctrine was declared promising to provide US military and economic aid to nations 'in the general area of the Middle East,' the US government still had not officially adopted the term 'Middle East' in terms of its organisational structure. [36]

Mahan had used the term Middle East to refer to the Gulf and its coasts; he did not have a definite geographical boundary. Instead, he used the 'Middle East' as a 'shifting strategic concept' to denote the significance of this part of the world and the emerging rivalry between Russia and Britain in Asia. In the decades following the Second World War, the 'Middle East' -remaining true to its 'character' as a 'shifting strategic concept- shifted as technology developed. From late 19th century onwards, the British and later the United States were interested in the region mainly due to its geo-strategic location. Where the 'Middle East' was located was more important to British policy-makers than anything else, for it served as the communication centre on the route to India. In the meantime, the British Navy switched from coal to oil, and dependence on oil worldwide began to increase. Major oil discoveries were made in the 'Middle East' during the 1940s. The region, in addition to its geo-strategic significance, became important as a region where major oil reserves were located. The United States, coming later to the regional scene, was interested in what the 'Middle East' was, i.e. an oil-rich part of the world. Neither Britain, nor the United States were much interested in who constituted the region -until the number of Jewish settlers in Palestine began to increase and Israel declared its independence in 1948, that is. This, in one sense, may explain the long time lack of regionalism and the little evidence of enthusiasm for regional integration in the 'Middle East'. For, this group of peoples (later states) were lumped together in line with the projects and wishes of external actors. In other words, the 'Middle East' was used for external purposes, without paying due regard to the interests and ambitions of peoples living in this part of the world. Accordingly, the security of the 'Middle East' during most of the 20th century has meant 'the defence of the "Middle East"' from any external power that threatened British and US interests in this part of the world. During the Cold War, this meant the defence of the 'Middle East' against Soviet expansionism. [37] Since Soviet expansionism used indirect as well as direct means, the maintenance of stability in the region so as to thwart communist infiltration became a central focus of Anglo-American policy. Stability, in turn, was taken to mean the maintenance of bases in the region.

In the post-colonial era, the 'Middle East' as a term and as a concept, was often viewed as a 'colonial relic' at best and as an imperialist tool for 'discrediting the calls for Arab unity' at worst. [38] Recently, a new discourse, that of a 'Greater Middle East' has got to be pronounced. [39] It is yet another scheme being introduced from outside largely in line with the security policies and practices of some external actors. Now I will turn to alternative spatial conceptions that have been propounded during the Cold War before coming back to a discussion on 'security complexes' as (yet another) alternative spatial conception in security terms.

II. Alternative conceptions

'Arab regional order'

(1)the term Middle East does not refer to a geographical area but rather it represents a political term in its creation and usage; (2)the term is not derived from the nature of the area or its political, cultural, civilisational and demographic characteristics; for when we use the term 'Middle' we have to ask 'middle' in reference to what?; and (3) the term tears up the Arab homeland as a distinct unit since it has always included non-Arab states. [41]

Replacing the 'Middle East' with the term 'Arab regional order' has one advantage; it is an indigenously generated term -not 'a euphemism for secure spheres of influence' for any outside power, to use Dessouki and Matar's words. [43] However, it still is not an improvement over the term 'Middle East'. For one thing, it downplays the existence of non-Arab peoples in this part of the world. For another thing, it neglects the primary role played by Israel, Iran and Turkey in the affairs of this part of the world, especially in security terms. [44] In other words, the portrayal of the region as an 'Arab regional order' overemphasises the Arab 'character' of the region whilst neglecting three non-Arab states and non-Arab peoples.

Although there has always been a gap between what Arab regimes said and did (Arab nationalism has always been stronger at the discursive level than at the level of governmental practices) it grew even bigger when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. In one sense, governmental practices of the post-Cold War era illustrate well the reinforcement of statist norms by Arab policy-makers. [45] Even references of the 'Arab regional order' or the vague concept of 'Arab security' were not resorted to as often as had been in the past. [46] At the level of Arab peoples and especially social movements, however, the concept 'Arab regional order' continues to strike a chord. Although actions taken in line with this concept are no longer seen as steps towards the establishment of 'Arab unity' it is still widely pronounced that closer cooperation and collaboration between Arab states and peoples is the best way to enhance their security.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, some regional peoples (and analysts) seem to have concurred already that a new 'Arab regional order' is in order. [47] There are signs of life in Arab social movements pushing towards this direction. They take less the form of the stereotypical pan-Arabist movements that called for 'Arab unity' during the 1950s, than the form of civil societal groupings that emphasise 'Arab' identity, culture, homeland and nationhood whilst working towards more democratisation and social justice at home. The number of Arab NGOs and other civil societal associations have nearly doubled between 1990 and 1995. [48] Moreover, the Arab vision -whether it takes the form of calls for greater 'Arab unity' or 'Arab regional order'- remains to be the one Arab intellectuals favour. Some, notes Ibrahim, still hold on to ideals of 'liberation and unification of all Arab peoples and lands' and adds: 'Arab socialists would add "social justice" and Arab liberals would add "democracy" to these goals.' [49]

Arab intellectuals, since the mid 1970s have been organising professionally at the regional Arab level. Amongst the institutions established are the Arab Association of Sociologists, the Arab Association of Political Scientists, Association of Arab historians (1974), Association of Arab Universities (1964), the pan-Arab organisation of human rights, the Beirut based Center for Arab Unity Studies (1975), and the Jordan based Arab Thought Forum (1985). Arab women's organisations have also been active in strengthening civil society in the Arab world. [50] The Cairo based Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies has been publishing a newsletter entitled Civil Society: Democratic Transformation in the Arab World since 1989 and claims a readership of 5000. The aim of the journal is stated as strengthening 'nascent democratic forces in the Arab world and at the same time to serve as a networking function among organizations of the Arab civil society.' [51]

It may be argued that the 'Arab regional order' is currently not in too good a shape. However, as Ibrahim notes, currently the strength of the 'Arab regional order' comes not from it proponents' ability to put the 'Arab regional order' in order but from their capacity to criticise (and at times discredit) the alternatives, such as in the case of the 'Middle East' as seen in Dessouki and Matar's work discussed above. [52] The fact is not only that what one Arab state does is closely watched by the others, but also that the links established between Arab peoples by way of migration, labour flow and remittances make it impossible for some states to ignore the concerns of the peoples of other Arab states which they might otherwise have chosen to neglect. [53] As Ibrahim notes, Arab civil societal formations are active enough to make 'the coercive impulses of ruling Arab elite increasingly difficult to act out.' [54]

The 'Mediterranean world'

Among Mediterranean littoral states of the 'Arab world', Egypt is the one that is more in touch with its Mediterranean past (and present). In Egypt, in the years that followed the independence many Western educated/oriented intellectuals advocated Egypt's Mediterranean (therefore Western, in their eyes) character. The Mediterranean dimension of Egypt's policies were underplayed in the post-World War II era when Egypt joined the League of Arab States and later took part in the 1948 war. Gamal Abdel Nasser's advent to power (1954) was also decisive in this respect. During Nasser's presidency the Mediterranean dimension of Egypt's foreign policy was shelved for over twenty years. [56]

The debate between those who advocated the Mediterranean dimension of Egypt's identity and those who emphasised its Arab and Islamic dimensions was revived during the 1970s following Nasser's death. It was partly Nasser's death and partly Anwar al-Sadat's rise to power that enabled some intellectuals to dust off the Mediterranean vision of the 1930s and revive the debate. Some well-known Egyptian intellectuals of the time argued that 'the time had come for Egypt to stop fighting the battles of the Arabs.' [57] Another factor that enabled the Mediterranean vision to see the sunlight once again was the peace treaty with Israel that resulted in Egypt's isolation from Arab and Islamic institutions. Its break with the Soviet Union in 1972 too enabled Egypt to re-establish close relations with the West. By the 1970s the last traces of colonialism were also gone; there were more independent non-European Mediterranean-littoral states for Egypt to identify with thereby helping re-introduce the Mediterranean dimension into Egyptian politics.

Around the same time a change-of-heart on the part of some European states (following the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and the ensuing crisis) to adopt a more equivocal attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict resulted in the establishment of the Euro-Arab dialogue in 1973. The relationship between the EU and Arab states did not achieve much, largely because of the mistrust of the Cold War years. It was reactivated in 1989-90 only to be interrupted by the Gulf crisis (1990-91) and to be reactivated again in 1992. [58] The links established as a part of the Euro-Arab dialogue formed the backbone of the Mediterranean vision during the 1990s.

However, despite its widespread use, the definition of the 'Mediterranean' is not clear. The concept 'Mediterranean world' seems to be used rather as a neutral term to refer to any cooperation between some European and Arab states. Currently, the relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean littoral countries of the 'Middle East' fall into four categories:

1. The multilateral relationship with all the Arab states of the region, through the Euro-Arab dialogue;
2. The network of bilateral cooperation agreements under the 'overall Mediterranean policy';
3. The new emphasis on multilateral agreements with sub-regional organisations of states in the Middle East, (the Arab Maghreb Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council);
4. Other group relations between EC member states of the Western Mediterranean and the Spanish-Italian proposal for a 'Conference on Security and cooperation in the Mediterranean' (CSCM). [59]

Changes within the character of some European states' populations generated by the migration of Muslim peoples to some European states (France and Italy from North Africa, Germany and the Netherlands from Turkey) also caused them to become more sensitive towards the wishes of Middle Eastern states with Muslim populations for domestic societal purposes. In this sense, the EU's security practices in the Middle East since the early 1970s have to be understood within a context created by the convergence of domestic societal as well as economic concerns. [61] Since the early 1970s, the EU's policies have been shaped around three major concerns: energy security (understood as the sustained flow of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices); [62] regional stability (understood as an increase in domestic resilience especially in the geographically closer North African societies towards serving the dual purposes of reducing refugee flows into Western Europe and to prevent Middle Eastern problems being exported to Europe); and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. [63]

The Gulf War only reinforced the view already underlined in theory by the EU that 'regional economic solidarity among all the peoples of the region' is 'a cornerstone for peace, stability, and development in the Middle East' which is viewed as a necessary component of European security. [64] Accordingly the EU undertook the attempt to strengthen regionalism amongst the Arab states it targeted by way of supporting existing organisations such as the Arab League, GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) and AMU (Arab Maghreb Union). Additionally Spain and Italy put forward a proposal for the establishment of a 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean' (CSCM). [65] The idea has been criticised on the grounds that it covered a very wide area, for initially it was being planned to invite any state with 'any substantial interest'. This would have meant bringing together all twelve members of the EU, the 17 non-EU-Mediterranean littoral states (Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Romania, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia), the nine Gulf and Arabian peninsula states (including Iran and Iraq), three other states (Canada, the Soviet Union and the United States), and one other UN-recognised entity: Palestine. The long-term objectives and principles were going to be on similar lines to those of the CSCE/OSCE, dealing with the issue baskets of security, economic cooperation and human rights. [66]

The EU's attempts to revive the Euro-Arab dialogue and Spanish-Italian proposal for the establishment of CSCM coincided with a call by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarek in November 1991 for the establishment of a Mediterranean Forum. He stated the objectives of the Forum as: 'enhancing dialogue and interaction among governmental and non-governmental actors in search for problem-solving and maximizing cooperation between Europe and the Middle East.' [67] Mubarek's choice of words is interesting; for he clearly viewed the Mediterranean Forum as a meeting ground for Europe and the Middle East, rather than conceiving the 'Mediterranean world' as a region in itself. Egyptian policy-makers, according to Selim, view the Mediterranean Forum as a technical institution for channeling European aid to the Southern Mediterranean states. Unlike the declared aims of their Italian, Spanish, Tunisian and Moroccan counterparts, Egyptian policy-makers do not want to grant any Mediterranean institution any mandate in security matters, preferring to deal with the United States. [68] Hence their lack of support for the Spanish-Italian CSCM proposal. Still Egyptian policy-makers do not rule out possible future cooperation in the security field. [69] Admittedly, a major drawback for any Mediterranean grouping/institution, in the eyes of Egyptian (and possible some other Arab) policy-makers is the lack of US interest. Arguably the two minds Egyptian policy-makers seem to be in is caused by the difficulty of choosing between the two visions backed by two external actors: the Middle Eastern vision backed largely by the United States and the Mediterranean vision backed by the EU.

In sum, the Mediterranean vision does not have too many proponents (especially in the Southern Mediterranean) but it does not have many against it either. Both Syria and Israel have responded positively to invitations; no one has declined so far. Ibrahim notes that 'unlike the Middle Eastern paradigm, the partnership has not generated active hostility in the Arab world. This may be due to the absence of the USA and the fact that the Israeli question does not play dominant parts.' [70] Selim notes that there are some such as the Islamists in Egypt who view the Mediterranean vision 'as an attempt to rally Europe alongside Egypt against the Islamic resurgence movement.' Accordingly they view Mediterraneanism as an 'alliance between Arab secular regimes and Europe against Islam'. [71] Some Egyptian policy-makers, on the other hand, see the 'Mediterranean world' as a way of bringing Arab states as well as Israel under one scheme without moving too many stones, i.e. by way of doing this in an even larger framework that includes both the EU and the United States under a somewhat neutral name such as the 'Mediterranean'. Then, as Ibrahim out it, the strength of the 'Mediterranean' as an alternative regional conception may come not from its supporters who are not many, but from the fact that unlike the Middle Eastern or Islamist visions, it does not have too many enemies. [72]

The 'Muslim world'

The Islamist vision conceives of all Muslims as its audience. Theoretically, then, all lands on which Muslims live defines 'the region' for this vision. In other words, the Islamist vision has a globalist discourse. During the first decade following the Iranian revolution (1979) Iran's practice seemed to live up to this globalist discourse with its anti-Israeli and anti-US rhetoric being matched by the support it provided for the PLO and other Muslims' liberation movements around the world. This has began to change following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Since then Iran has mellowed down its globalist revolutionary discourse and concentrated on mending fences at the international arena and emphasised domestic development whilst keeping the revolutionary spirit up at the homefront. [74] Likewise, despite their shared globalist discourse (that has its roots in the universalistic outlook of 'Islam') most Islamist social movements aim to bring about change in their localities -even though they do undertake action abroad to achieve this aim. The globalist outlook of the Islamist vision at the theoretical and discursive level therefore becomes locally oriented in practice. Practice also indicates that the self-consciously Islamist regimes of Iran and Sudan, and social movements such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Afghani Mujahideen, and Algerian FIS all address themselves first and foremost to the localities they live in. [75] In Egypt, for instance, the main causes that motivated the actions of Islamists movements were the food riots in Cairo (January 1977), unemployment, acute housing shortages, poverty, and Sadat's open door economic program -not to forget the Camp David Accords. [76]

Then the 'Muslim world' as a concept is seen by the 'Islamists' in the 'Middle East' as a potential way of uniting Muslim peoples in this part of the world (Arab states plus Iran and Turkey) against Israel (and its main backer, the United States) which they consider as the main threat to the Muslims. In other words, the Islamists propound the 'Muslim world' as an alternative concept as a way of bringing together all Muslims in the 'Middle East' by way of invoking an 'Islamic' discourse that strikes a chord among most Muslims. However limited Islam's impact on determining peoples' lives in the Middle East (or anywhere else in the world) may be, this arguably is their aim.

The Islamist vision from its very origins has been an indigenous movement that found its reason of existence in the resistance against 'un-Islamic' (but not necessarily non-Islamic) influences. [77] Some Islamists criticise the existing political and religious establishments as well as the forces of Arab (or any other) nationalism as being un-Islamic [78] and aim at unifying all Muslims; but the exact details as to how this unification would be achieved is not clear. Still, however vague the Islamist vision may seem, its many proponents have carved their niches in various countries that have Muslim populations and have been undertaking action towards increasing communication and cooperation amongst Muslims.

Arguably there is more agreement amongst the proponents of the Islamist vision as to what they are against than what they are for. [79] They are against the vague entity of un-Islamic influences that may comprise anything and everything. For, there is not an agreement as to what really constitutes 'Islamic' (or 'un-Islamic' for that matter). During the Gulf War (1991) the conservative 'Islamic' Kindgom of Saudi Arabia was blamed for following 'un-Islamic' policies when it invited US troops (allowed 'infidels') to step on the holy lands. [80] There are others who define the existence of structural violence as 'un-Islamic' and fight towards its erosion. [81] The Islamists' political aims are very broad, practical programs -admittedly- vague. [82] However, some of them have proved to be very successful at the micro level, responding concretely to people's problems by providing educational and social welfare services. [83]

The Islamists also have an unfavourable visibility at times. The activities they have engaged include causing unrest in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, undertaking suicide bombings in Lebanon and Israel, assassinating numerous state officials, journalists, intellectuals and killing tourists. Some proponents of the Islamist vision, for instance, contend that Muslims are discriminated against by Western powers, 'Jewish Zionism' and the 'un-Islamic' regimes of the Muslim states that collaborate with them. The way out, as they see it, is to rise up and fight both the corrupt rulers in their own states and the 'Western-Zionist hegemonic powers' that support them at the international level. They see their task as achieving the unity of all Muslims and enable them to become 'virtuous and powerful' [84] -which again might mean anything and everything. In some countries, however, Islamist social movements represent possibly the only 'authentic' alternative to 'corrupt, exhausted, and ineffectual regimes.' [85] Some of these, as Ibrahim has observed within the Egyptian context, are grassroots movements that have set out to present 'concrete Islamic alternatives to the socio-economic institutions of the state and the capitalist sector'. [86] The proponents of the Islamist vision define security in relation to two criteria: the absence of un-Islamic influences, and working towards increasing unity of Muslim peoples which would ultimately enable them to be 'virtuous and powerful'. [87] However common it may be to lump together all Islamist peoples and movements under the banner 'Islamic fundamentalist', differences within Muslims do not allow any generalisation. In other words, not all Islamists that work towards greater unity among Muslims buy into a view of the world that is divided between dar-us-salam and dar-ul-harb. Very few among them believe in the necessity of fighting all 'infidels' to achieve 'peace'. [88] For one thing, neither peace nor war are as simple and straightforward concepts in Islam as some present (and others believe) to be. [89] In Arabic, the language of the Qur'an and the dominant language in which Islam has been studied and practised for centuries, the concept peace is expressed by two different words: salam, meaning a sense of tranquillity and salvation; and sulh meaning the state of truce or armistice reached at the end of a war. [90] Moreover, one can tease out at least six different meanings of the word salam from its use in the Qur'an; these include 'an unworldly sense of security and permanence, soundness, preservation/salvation, salutation, resignation without discontentment, and freedom from jarring elements'. [91]

There is an assumption that the existing system which divides believers into separate (nation-) states is against 'Islam' and that Muslims in general and fundamentalists in particular would like to revive the ummah (early transnational community of believers) as the primary political unit. [92] However it is also true that most Islamist movements by now have accepted the reality of the state and look toward the ummah only within the broader context of Islamic universalism, i.e. as a way of emphasising their common Muslim identity. Accordingly some assert that 'national reform is not contrary to, but a necessary step in and part of the reconstitution of Islamic universalism.' [93]

In sum, the 'Muslim world' is still far from presenting a viable alternative regional conception. The lack of detailed schemes, programs and projects are the biggest drawbacks for the Islamists. Ibrahim notes that like the 'Arab' vision, the Islamists' vision it is 'more a promise than a reality; it can "break" but does not "make".' [94]

III. Back to square one? The Middle East as a security complex

Muhammad Faour, for instance, submitted that the Gulf War 'atomised' the 'Arab regional order'

with each state placing its domestic interests ahead of regional or subregional interests and thereby undermining any hope of making organizations such as the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union effective instruments of collective Arab policy. [96]

It is also worth remembering that the United States was able to re-introduce itself to the region and be accepted largely due to its constructive role in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. The Madrid Peace Conference was convened in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis as a part of the pre-war deal the US policy-makers made with the international public opinion in general and regional states in particular. The pace generated by the Madrid talks enabled the Palestinian-Israeli agreement concluded in Oslo (1993). This, in turn, enhanced the credibility of the United States thereby strengthening the 'Middle East' against other contending definitions. [98]

During the Madrid talks, the Middle Eastern vision received a boost; the concept of 'Middle Easternism' was introduced by Egyptian policy-makers. Michael Barnett describes the concept as follows:

Those who champion Middle Easternism envision an Arab order alongside a Middle Eastern order, with the former protecting the shared Arab identity and the latter recognising that all states of the region have shared interests that can be furthered through close coordination and cooperation. [99]

Barnett also relates the following incident as exemplary of the contested character of the term 'Middle East'. He notes that during a talk at Ain-Shams University in Cairo in Spring 1996, one listener responded to his discussion of the possibility of regionalism in the 'Middle East' by asserting that this was 'imperialism by regionalism'. Considering Israel's economic/technological and military might as compared to its Arab counterparts it is understandable that they have their reservations about the creation of a Middle Eastern Common Market, or any other 'Middle Eastern' scheme. After all, as Barnett points out, when the Israelis say 'interdependence', the Arabs hear 'dependence'. [101]

On the other hand, there are more financial and political resources available for the materialisation of Middle Eastern schemes the backers of which currently include not only the United States and World Bank, but also some oil-rich Arab countries. These may be good enough reasons for governments and policy-makers to decide to cooperate within a 'Middle Eastern' framework but it may not be that easy to convince non-governmental actors and certain parts of the elite. Boulding notes how one of the participants to the workshops on the 'Commission document on peace building in the Middle East' rejected association with the project uttering the following:

My visions of the future...have been frustrated by a folkloric and quasi paternalistic approach to the future of the Middle East. It is a post-colonization of other peoples which excludes the expression of their endogenous dreams and visions. [102]

As can be deduced from the comments quoted above, the main problem facing the 'Middle East' as a regional definition is that not all states and peoples want to be parts of it. Unlike the Cold War years when it was Arab policy-makers and the elite that opposed any Middle Eastern scheme, it is now non-state actors and especially social movements that argue against it. [104] However attractive creating links of interdependence at the regional, i.e. Middle Eastern, level as a way of building peace may seem to some, certain segments of the elite and social movements oppose it for the same reason. In other words, they do not want to be dependent on any non-Arab and/or un-Islamic entity.

As emphasised in the introduction, the argument put forward in this paper is that the answers peoples of the region (this part of the world formerly known as the Middle East) give to the questions Who are we? and Which region do we belong to? are very important in terms of what they do with their future. Through the creation of a regional identity and strengthening the sense of belonging, for instance, cooperation and interdependence may take root. They may choose to define insecurity as their common enemy by way of conceiving themselves as part of a 'security complex'. [105] In the remainder of the paper I will discuss how viewing this group of states as a 'security complex' may constitute a first step on the way to saw the seeds of regionalism towards the establishment of a 'security community'.

Barry Buzan, in People, States and Fear introduced the concept of 'security complex' as an analytical tool when studying security. His contention was that when conceptualising the regional level, one should do away with territoriality and voluntarism (which turned out to be problematic as seen in the first two parts of this paper) but emphasise the present patterns of amity and enmity. This, argues Buzan, would enable the analyst to treat a group of states together in a 'security complex', i.e. as an intermediate level between the levels of states and the international system, whether or not those states recognise themselves to be operating as part of one whole. Accordingly, he defines a 'security complex' as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.' [106] By way of this definition, Buzan re-introduces the role of external actors when he argues that a Middle Eastern security complex might exist whether indigenous actors recognise it or not. [107] It is in this sense that the 'security complex' as an analytical tool is useful in bringing together a group of states to show their securities are interdependent upon one another's policies. Coming to see the fact that their securities are interdependent and that they have to cooperate towards achieving stable security might constitute a first, but nevetheless crucial step towards sawing the seeds of regionalism in the 'Middle East'.

However, although external actors' (including analysts) view (and perhaps encouragement and support) is important, what is also very important is the creation of a distinct identity within the construct -regardless of what we come to call it, a 'security complex' or a 'region'- if it is to become a 'security community' in Karl Deutsch's terms. Deutsch and his associates defined a security community as 'one in which where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each either physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.' [108] As Wæver also indicates, security complex as a concept does not contain the standards for change towards a security community. Rather security complex is an analytical tool for analysing the processes and explaining the dynamics of security in a given area; it does not show or attempt to change the quality of relationships at a given time within a given area. [109] Still, given the lack of enthusiasm for regionalism (as a way of establishing security) in the 'Middle East', the 'Middle Eastern security complex' as a concept is a good place for the analyst to start with. Some Arab regimes and non-governmental organisations may not include Iran, Israel and Turkey in their definitions of the region they live in; Turkey and Israel, on the other hand may view themselves as belonging to Europe rather than the 'Middle East'. Nevertheless, when viewed in security terms, they are all parts of a Middle Eastern (in)security complex; they all take each other into account when making their calculations, especially when it comes to buying military equipment.

Then, although the concept of security complex in itself may not involve standards for change, as Wæver has rightly pointed out, to convince regional actors that they are all involved within the same security complex may arguably be a first step towards the creation of a security community. A second step might be taken when they begin to see themselves not as victims of each other (or the past) but of insecurity which has to be overcome through cooperative efforts. [110] A third step may be the creation of security regimes on a number of issue areas, as Ken Booth has suggested, so that a complex web of different regimes would help establish and maintain security in this part of the world. This may allow the co-existence of all these four visions presented above; each helping address the issues they are most concerned with. The involvement of non-governmental organisations may also help bring out issues that are not usually met by states' policies. In the long-run, with possible spill-over effects, these security regimes may contribute towards building a security community. [111]

Viewed from the lens of Critical Security Studies, it is the issues of water, food, population, productivity, environment, and education in addition to those of arms proliferation, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction, and expansionist regimes, that are the main problems in the region; for it is these very issues that cause insecurity for peoples lives. Hence the Critical Security Studies call to understand and practice security at different levels in reference to multiple referents (subjects of security) and by way of multiple agents (actors that act for security, i.e. social movements, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, individuals as well as states). Our understanding and practices of security, then, should be informed by a view of security that is cognisant of the complexities involved in human affairs. The insecurity in the 'Middle East' attests well to this.

Notes

2. See Andrew Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,' in Regionalism in World Politics op. cit., 54-58 for a discussion on the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation. [*]

3. See Muhtiah Alagappa, 'Regionalism and conflict management: a Framework for Analysis,' Review of International Studies 21:4 (1995) 359-387; Paul Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World: Regional and the Global Process (London: Pinter, 1993) esp. chapter 2: 'The practice of regionalism,' pp. 24-45; Fawcett, 'Regionalism in Historical Perspective,' 9-36. [*]

4. See Charles Tripp, 'Regionalism in the Arab Middle East,' in Regionalism in World Politics, op. cit., esp. pp.299-307; Michael Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' Political Science Quarterly, 111:4 (1996-97) 597-618, and 'Sovereignty, nationalism, and regional order in the Arab states system,' International Organization 49:3 (Summer 1995) 479-510; Ibrahim Awad, 'The Future of Regional and Subregional Organization in the Arab World,' in The Arab World Today, Dan Tschirgi, ed. (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 147-160. [*]

5. Shimon Peres (with Arye Naor), The New Middle East (Dorset: Element, 1993). [*]

6. Barnett 'Regional security after the Gulf War,' 604. [*]

7. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' Security Dialogue 27:4 (1996) 428-430; Paul Aarts, 'The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?' Paper presented at the BRISMES (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies) Conference, Birmingham 5-8 July, 1998, esp. pp. 14-17. [*]

8. Aarts, 'The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?' [*]

9. Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East.' [*]

10. See Khaled A. M. Bayomi, 'The Construction of a Middle Eastern Region and the roots of modernity process in the Arab homeland.' Paper presented at the 4[th] Nordic Conference for Middle East Studies, Oslo, August 13-16 1998. [*]

11. See Nikki Keddie, 'Is there a Middle East?' International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973) 267; Dale Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, 2[nd] ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Darwin Press, 1989) 4; Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 1 'The Classical Age of Islam.' (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974) 60. [*]

12. See Ghassan Salamé, 'The Middle East: Elusive Security, Indefinable Region,' Security Dialogue 25:1 (1994) 17-35; Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East.' [*]

13. For a more detailed elaboration of the relationship between security discourses and regions, see Pinar Bilgin, 'Inventing Middle Easts? The Making of a Region Through Security Discourse: a Critical Security Studies Perspective' paper presented at CRIPT Workshop, University of Bristol, November 8, 1997. [*]

14. See Ole Wæver, 'Conflicts of Vision: Visions of Conflict,' in European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation, Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre & Elzbieta Tromer, eds. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989) 283-325. [*]

15. See Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Contending Philosophies About Security in Europe,' in Security and Strategy in the New Europe, Colin McInnes, ed. (London & New York; Routledge, 1992) 3-36. [*]

16. Booth & Wheeler, 'Contending Philosophies About Security in Europe,' 5. [*]

17. See Kären E. Wigen & Martin W. Lewis, The Myth of Continents: a Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,' 37-73. [*]

18. See inter alia Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era, 2[nd] ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 [1983]); Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining security,' Foreign Affairs 68: 2 (Spring 1990) 162-177; Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' Review of International Studies 17 (1991) 313-326; Ken Booth, ed. New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991). [*]

19. See Buzan, People, States and Fear, esp. pp. 186-229, for security complexes. [*]

20. Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist,' in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, Keith Krause & Michael Williams, eds. (London: UCL Press, 1998) 83-119. [*]

21. The term 'shifting strategic concept is from Mahan. See A.T. Mahan, 'Persian Gulf and International Relations,' The National Review (September 1902) 27-45. [*]

22. See Nikki R. Keddie, 'Material culture and geography: toward a holistic comparative history of the Middle East,' Comparative Study of Society and History (1984) 709-733, and 'Is there a Middle East?'; Roderic H. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' Foreign Affairs 38 (1960) 665-675, also published in The Modern Middle East, Richard Nolte, ed. (New York: Atherton Press, 1963) 13-29. [*]

23. Mahan, 'Persian Gulf and International Relations.' [*]

24. See Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: The Belkanp Press of Harvard University Press, 1991) 355; Ahmed M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics 1941 to 1945 (London: Longman, 1977) 99. [*]

25. Amir Taheri, The Cauldron: The Middle East Behind the Headlines (London: Hutchinson, 1988) 2-3. It is interesting to note that Nasser, whilst employing the term 'Middle East' conceived of Egyptian security in relation to three concentric circles, namely the Arab, African and Muslim worlds. See Ali. E. Hillal Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for independence,' in Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences , Wm. Roger Louis & Roger Owen, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) 31-41. [*]

26. Taheri, The Cauldron, 2-3. [*]

27. Keith W. Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel - the Silencing of Palestinian History (London & New York: Routledge, 1996) 40. Note the dispute over 'Persian'/'Arab' Gulf, the 'Irish' Sea. [*]

28. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, 3. [*]

29. See, for example, A.E.H. Dessouki and G. Matar, The Arab Regional System: an Examination of Inter-Arab Political Relations (Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1979) [in Arabic] summarized in Abdel Monem Said Aly Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers and regional security in the Middle East,' in Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from southeast Asia and the Middle East, Mohammed Ayoob, ed. (London: Croom Helm, 1986) 197-8. Also see Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-91, Clare Krjzl, trans. (London: Macmillan, 1993) for a summary and critique of Dessouki and Matar's work. [*]

30. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 667-8 [*]

31. Roger Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902-1922 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995) 26. [*]

32. Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 24. [*]

33. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?,' 668. [*]

34. Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 97-100. [*]

35. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?,' 669. [*]

36. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?,' 666. [*]

37. See John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958) for an early review of US interests in and policies towards the 'Middle East.' [*]

38. See Dessouki & Matar, The Arab Regional System op. cit. in footnote 29. [*]

39. See Robert D. Blackwill & Michael Stürmer, eds. Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Gulshan Dietl, 'The Greater Middle East:The Emergence of a New Region?' Paper Presented at the 4th Nordic Conference for Middle East Studies, Oslo August 13-16 1998. [*]

40. For a summary and endorsement of Dessouki and Matar's arguments, see Abdel Aal, 'Superpowers and regional security in the Middle East,' 197-8. [*]

41. Ibid. [*]

42. Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab regional order failed?' International Affairs 67: 1 (1991) 487-490. Paul Noble, 'The Arab System: pressures, constraints, and opportunities,' in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: the challenge of change, Bahgat Korany & Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds. (Boulder: Westview, 1984);; Muhammaf Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993). [*]

43. Abdel Aal, 'Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,' 198. [*]

44. See, for example, Mohemed Riad, 'A view from Cairo,' in The Middle East in World Politics, Mohamed Ayoob, ed. (London: Croom Helm, 1981) 18-39. [*]

45. Adeed Dawisha, 'The Gulf War: A Defining Event?' in The Arab World Today, op. cit. in footnote 4. [*]

46. See Baghat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: the Persistence of Dualism,' in The Arab World Today, op. cit. in footnote 4, 164-165. [*]

47. Ibrahim Karawan, 'Arab dilemmas in the 1990s: Breaking Taboos and Searching for Signposts,' Middle East Journal 48:3 (Summer 1994) 451. [*]

48. Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 427-428. Also see Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm for a more skeptical view on the potentialities of civil societal groupings in the Arab World. [*]

49. Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 428. Also see Hisham Sharabi, 'Introduction: patriarchy and dependency and the future of Arab society,' in The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988) 6-7. [*]

50. See 'A view from the region: Middle East Studies in the Arab world, interview with Salim Nasr,' Middle East Report (October-December 1997) 16-18; Sharabi, The Next Arab Decade; Elise Boulding, 'Peace Building: Regional Processes in a Global Context,' in Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, Elise Boulding, ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 43. [*]

51. Ibid. Boulding notes that the October 1992 issue of the newsletter covers activities in eleven countries: Egypt, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Tunisia., see footnote 19, p. 63. [*]

52. Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 428. [*]

53. For the linkages between the rich and poor Arab states, see Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1997). [*]

54. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Arab Elites and Societies After the Gulf Crisis,' in The Arab World Today, op. cit. in footnote 4, 85-89. [*]

55. See Thierry Hentch, Hayali Dogu: Batinin Akdenizli Dogu'ya Politik Bakisi [Imagined East: the West's Political View of the Mediterranean East] Aysel Bora, trans. (Istanbul: Metis, 1996) 30; Dennis Hay, Europe: the Emergence of an Idea, rvs. ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1968 [1957]) 50-51. [*]

56. Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, 'Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy,' Kurasat Istratijiya [Strategic Papers of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies] 4: 27 (1995) [http://www.acpss.org/ekuras/ek27/ek27.html]. [*]

57. Selim, 'Mediterraneanism'. [*]

58. See Gary Miller, 'An integrated communities approach,' in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, Gerd Nonneman, ed. (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1997) 7-13, for an overview of the collective Euro-Arab relationship from 1973 onwards. Also see Haifaa Jawad, The Euro-Arab dialogue: A Study in Collective Diplomacy (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992); Francis O. Wilcox, 'Towards Barcelona: the Making and Remaking of Euro-Med Relations,' paper presented at the 4th Nordic Conference for Middle East Studies, Oslo, August 13-16, 1998. See Selim ('Mediterraneanism') for developments after 1992. [*]

59. Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach,' 7. [*]

60. Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach,' 8. [*]

61. Eberherd Rhein, 'Europe and the Grater Middle East,' in Allies Divided, op. cit. in footnote 39, 41-59. [*]

62. The EU is considerbaly more dependant on Middle eastern oil than the United States. The US imports 20% of its total energy consumption from the Middle East whereas it is between 50-90% for some of its European counterparts. See Rhein, 'Europe and the Greater Middle East,' 49. [*]

63. See Volker Perthes, 'Europe, the United States, and the Middle East Peace Process, in Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, op. cit. in footnote 39, 89-90. [*]

64. Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach,' 13. [*]

65. Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach,' 13; Niblock, 'Towards a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM),' in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, op. cit. in footnote 58, 245-251. [*]

66. Niblock, 'Towards a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East,' 247. [*]

67. Hosni Mubarek, Mubarek's Speeches in His European Trip: November 18-20 (In Arabic) (Cairo: State Information Organization, 1991) quoted in Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 430. [*]

68. Selim, 'Mediterraneanism'. [*]

69. A joint international forum was held in Casablanca, Morocco between 14- 16 December, 1995. Under the title "Civil Society and Euro- Arab Dialogue", the forum was attended by nearly 100 participants from several European and Arab countries. This forum was yet another example of the ever increasing dialogue between Europe and the Arab world - a trend which had already begun in previous years. See 'Civil Society and the Euro- Arab Dialogue,' Civil Society 5: 50 (February 1996) at <http://www.ned.org/page_3/ICDS/1996/feb/north.html> [*]

70. Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 431. [*]

71. Selim, 'Mediterraneanism'. [*]

72. Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 431. [*]

73. Keddie, 'Is there a Middle East?' 269. [*]

74. John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality? 2[nd] ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 151. [*]

75. See Esposito, 'Islamic Organisations: Soldiers of God,' in The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality? 119-187, for an overview of Islamist/Islamic organisations and their visions. [*]

76. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality?,139. [*]

77. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality?, 128. [*]

78. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, 'Editor's introduction,' in Islamic Resurgence: Challenges, Directions and Future Perspectives, A Roundtable with Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim M. ed. (Lahore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1996) 24. [*]

79. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality?, 183-187. [*]

80. Dale E. Eickelman & James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) 15. [*]

81. Chaiwat Satha-Anand (Qader Muheideen) 'The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight theses on Muslim nonviolent action,' in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant & Saad E. Ibrahim, eds. (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 25-40, and 'Core values for peacemaking in Islam: The Prophet's Practice as Paradigm,' in Building Peace in the Middle East op. cit. in footnote 50, 295-302 [*]

82. See Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim M. ed. Islamic Resurgence. Also see Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality?, 184. [*]

83. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality?, 185. [*]

84. Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 432. [*]

85. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality?, 119. [*]

86. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Egypt's Islamic activism in the 1980s,' Third World Quarterly (April 1988) 643, quoted in Esposito, 133. [*]

87. See Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 432. [*]

88. Bernard Lewis writes: 'according to the jurists the permanent relationship between the world of Islam and the world of unbelievers was one of open or latent war. If this line of thought is uncritically accepted, the it will not be possible to talk about peace or peacemaking in Islam.' See his The political Language of Islam (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988) 78-79. Compare Lewis with Satha-Anand, 'Core Value for peacemaking in Islam,' and Satha-Anand, 'The nonviolent crescent: eight theses on Muslim nonviolent action,' in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, Ralph Crow, Philip Grant & Saad E. Ibrahim, eds. (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990) 25-28. Satha-Anand distinguishes between 'greater Jihad' and 'lesser Jihad' and emphasises the centrality of the struggle against structural violence. [*]

89. See James Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) esp. pp.42-45, for a discussion. [*]

90. Lewis The Political Language of Islam, 78-79. [*]

91. Satha-Anand, 'Core values for peacemaking in Islam: the Prophet's practice as paradigm,' 295. [*]

92. See James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States, 1-21, for a discussion of and an argument against this view. [*]

93. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Mtyh or Reality?, 186. [*]

94. Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 433. [*]

95. Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 430. [*]

96. Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 77. [*]

97. Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 97. [*]

98. See Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, esp. 93-96. Also see Barbara Victor, Hanan Ashrawi: a Passion for Peace (London: Fourth Estate, 1995) for an insider's account of the Madrid Peace talks. [*]

99. Barnett, 'Regional security after the Gulf War,' 604. [*]

100. Peres, The New Middle East. [*]

101. Barnett, 'Regional security after the Gulf War,' 604. [*]

102. Boulding, 'Dissenting comments by commission members and consultants,' in Boulding ....55. [*]

103. Robert Bowker, Beyond Peace: The Search for Security in the Middle East (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1996) 42. [*]

104. Ibrahim, 'Future visions of the Arab Middle East,' 430. [*]

105. Buzan, People, States and Fear, 186-229. [*]

106. Buzan, People, States and Fear, 190. [*]

107. Buzan, People, States and Fear, 192-202. [*]

108. Karl W. Deutsch, et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1957) 5. [*]

109. Wæver, 'Conflicts of Vision: Visions of Conflict,' 308-309. [*]

110. See Ken Booth & Peter Vale,' Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: the Case of Southern Africa,' in Critical Security Studies, op. cit. in footnote 20, 329-358. [*]

111. Ken Booth, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations,', Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, no. 24 (February 1994) 12. [*]